Bills Involving Taxation Must Originate in House of Representatives
Power of the Purse
Historical Highlight
"All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may suggest or concur with amendments as on other Bills."
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, section seven, clause one
"No Money shall exist drawn from the Treasury, just in Consequence of Appropriations made past Law; and a regular Statement and Business relationship of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Coin shall exist published from fourth dimension to time."
— U.S. Constitution, Article I, section ix, clause vii
/tiles/non-collection/i/i_origins_power_purse_approps_lc.xml Image courtesy of the Library of Congress The House Appropriations Committee in 1918 featuring (from left to correct) time to come Secretary of State James F. Byrnes of South Carolina, former Speaker Joseph Cannon of Illinois, Chairman J. Swagar Sherley of Kentucky, future Speaker Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts, time to come Secretary of War James W. Skillful of Iowa, and future Speaker Joseph Byrns of Tennessee.
Congress—and in particular, the House of Representatives—is invested with the "power of the pocketbook," the ability to tax and spend public money for the national authorities. Massachusetts' Elbridge Gerry said at the Federal Constitutional Convention that the Business firm "was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a saying that the people ought to hold the purse-strings."
Origins
English history heavily influenced the Ramble framers. The British House of Eatables has the exclusive correct to create taxes and spend that revenue, which is considered the ultimate check on imperial authorization. Indeed, the American colonists' cry of "No taxation without representation!" referred to the injustice of London imposing taxes on them without the benefit of a voice in Parliament.
Constitutional Framing
Debate at the Constitutional Convention centered on 2 issues. The showtime was to ensure that the executive would not spend coin without congressional authorization. The second concerned the roles the Business firm and Senate would play in setting fiscal policy.
At the Convention, the framers considered the extent to which the Senate—like the House of Lords—should be limited in its consideration of budget bills. The provision was part of a compromise between the big and modest states. Smaller states, which would exist over-represented in the Senate, would concede the power to originate money bills to the House, where states with larger populations would take greater control. Speaking in favor of the provision, Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania said, "It was a saying that those who experience, can best judge. This end would . . . be best attained, if money affairs were to exist bars to the immediate representatives of the people." The provision in the committee'due south report to the Convention was adopted, five to three, with three states divided on the question. The Convention reconsidered the affair over the course of two months, merely the provision was finally adopted, nine to two, in September 1787.
The constitutional provision making Congress the ultimate potency on regime spending passed with far less debate. The framers were unanimous that Congress, as the representatives of the people, should be in control of public funds—not the President or executive branch agencies. This strongly-held conventionalities was rooted in the framers' experiences with England, where the king had wide latitude over spending once the money had been raised.
The Early on Appropriations Process
The Showtime Congress (1789–1791) passed the first appropriations deed—a mere thirteen lines long—a few months after it convened. The police force funded the regime, including important pensions for Revolutionary War veterans, with only $639,000—an amount in the tens of millions in real terms. This simple process was short-lived. Over time, 9 regular appropriation bills emerged and funded such priorities as pensions, harbors, the post part, and the armed services. These were considered on an annual basis past the late 1850s. The House Committee on Ways and Ways, which too had jurisdiction over revenue enhancement policy, controlled the appropriations process. But legislation and funding were ever kept dissever. Priorities were spelled out in i law and money appropriated for those priorities in another. This has remained the practise, as substantive committees pattern authorization acts and the House and Senate Appropriation Committees fund authorized programs later on. Indeed, there are laws and parliamentary rules against making new law in cribbing bills, although such rules are periodically waived.
Subsequent Reforms
In 1865, later the Civil War had created a well-nigh $3 billion national debt and spending exceeded a billion dollars a year, Congress reformed its funding process to handle the authorities's new demands. The Business firm separated the Ways and Means Commission's taxing and spending functions. The Appropriations Committee was established to fund programs, while Means and Means retained jurisdiction on tax policy. House leadership and other committees also tried to influence the appropriations process, and the lack of coordination over the years led to high deficits and the implementation of the federal income tax in 1913. Congress passed the Budget and Accounting Human activity in 1921 to address some of the coordination bug it faced funding government programs. This law centralized many of the budgeting functions with the President, who still has considerable agenda-setting power with the federal budget and submits a draft budget to Congress at the beginning of every year. The appropriations procedure has been reformed multiple times since 1921, including notable restructurings with the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Acts of 1985 and 1987.
For Farther Reading
Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Rev. ed. 4 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale Academy Printing, 1937).
Garfield, James. "National Appropriations and Misappropriations," N American Review, 270: 572–586.
Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins. The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriations Process. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).
Kimmel, Lewis. Federal Upkeep and Fiscal Policy, 1789–1958. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Establishment, 1959).
Leloup, Lance. The Financial Congress. (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1980).
Schick, Allen. Congress and Money: Budgeting, Spending and Taxing. (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Found, 1980).
—. The Federal Upkeep: Politics, Policy, Process. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Establishment, 2000).
Selko, Daniel. The Federal Fiscal System. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1940).
Stewart, Charles H., Iii. Budget Reform Politics: The Blueprint of the Appropriations Procedure in the House of Representatives, 1865–1921. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Wildavsky, Aaron B. Budgeting and Governing. (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006).
—. The New Politics of the Budgetary Process. 5th ed. (New York: Longman, 2003).
Source: https://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Power-of-the-Purse/
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